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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Article VIII, §3 of the Utah Constitution, 
and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (1953 as amended), and Rule 3(a), 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final Judgment dated April 
6, 1988, and entered April 11, 1988, by the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court of Sevier County, State 
of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the district court err in concluding as a matter 
of law that Valley1s prior security interest in the cement 
mixer was junior and inferior to Plaintiffs1 claim of 
ownership to the cement mixer? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs instituted this action against Defendants 
for a determination that Plaintiffs1 claim to a 1978 In-
ternational cement mixer, ten yard, Cummins 230, serial no. 
CF57HHA23465 (the "cement mixer"), prevails over Defendants' 
interests in the cement mixer. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
On October 27, 1987, Plaintiff's filed a Verified 
Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the Sixth Judicial 
District Court in and for Sevier County, State of Utah, civil 
no. 10140, requesting a determination that Plaintiffs own and 
that Defendants have no interest in the cement mixer. (R. 1) 
Valley Bank and Trust Company and Valley Central Bank (col-
lectively referred to as "Valley") filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim. The Counterclaim alleged that Valley is 
entitled to its reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 
§78-27-56, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), for Plaintiffs1 
failure to bring their action in good faith. (R. 42) 
Plaintiffs replied to Valleys' Counterclaim (R. 54) and the 
parties began discovery proceedings. 
On March 3, 1988, Valley filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment which was followed by a Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by Plaintiffs on March 9, 1988. (R. 163, 
177) After hearing both parties' Motions for Summary 
Judgment, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs granted Plaintiffs1 
motion and denied Valley's motion. (R. 197) On April 6, 
1988, the court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, concluding that F. Creer has title to, and Valley has no 
interest in, the cement mixer. (R. 203; Addendum No. 1) 
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Judgment against Valley was entered by the court on April 6, 
1988 (R. 208) and on May 2, 1988, Valley filed a Notice of 
Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 212) Both parties 
subsequently moved for summary disposition of the case, which 
motions were denied by the court and the appeal was reserved 
for plenary review. 
3. Statement of Facts 
On April 22, 1982, Lays Rock Products, Inc. 
("Lays"), executed and delivered to Valley a promissory note 
("Note") in the principal sum of $250,000. (R. 204) As 
security for the Note, Lays executed and delivered to Valley 
a security agreement granting Valley a security interest in 
certain personal property, including the cement mixer, which 
is the subject of this action. (R. 204) Lays was the owner 
and had possession of the cement mixer at the time the 
security agreement was executed. (R. 8) Valley's security 
interest attached to the cement mixer, but was not perfected. 
(R. 167, 204) Lays was later merged into L.A. Young Sons 
Construction Company ("L.A. Young"). (R. 167, 204) 
Between approximately June, 1986, and March, 1987, 
Plaintiff, John P. Creer ("J.P. Creer") performed legal 
services for L.A. Young. (R. 204) L.A. Young, however, 
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failed to compensate J.P. Creer, for his legal services and 
in March, 1987, J.P. Creer informed L.A. Young that he would 
not continue legal representation unless L.A. Young paid J.P. 
Creer's legal bill. (R. 205) As a result, L.A. Young, 
through its president, Alan G. Young, executed and delivered 
to J.P. Creer a certificate of title to the cement mixer. (R. 
205) J.P. Creer later transferred title to the cement mixer 
to his son, Plaintiff, Frank Creer ("F. Creer"). (R. 205) 
There is nothing in the record to show that F. Creer gave any 
consideration to J.P. Creer for the transfer of the title. 
J.P. Creer transferred the vehicle to his son, F. Creer, 
because J.P. Creer did not want an uninsured vehicle regis-
tered in his name. (R. 134) 
At the time he received title to the cement mixer, 
J.P. Creer intended and understood that it was being trans-
ferred in partial satisfaction of L.A. Young's debt to J.P. 
Creer for previously rendered legal services and that it was 
not intended as security for that debt. (R. 205) J.P. Creer 
never received delivery or had possession of the cement 
mixer. (R. 205) F. Creer briefly obtained possession of the 
cement mixer for a few minutes in September, 1987, without 
the consent and against the will of the debtor's president, 
Alan Young. (R. 181-182, 190-191) Creer relinquished posses-
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sion of the cement mixer after being told by Alan Young that 
if F. Creer took the vehicle there would be a serious alter-
cation. (R. 181-182, 190-191) The cement mixer remained in 
the possession of L.A. Young until Marcus Taylor, as re-
ceiver, took possession of it. (R. 181, 191) Neither J.P. 
Creer nor F. Creer asserts a security interest in the cement 
mixer, but rather base their claim to the cement mixer on an 
ownership interest evidenced by the certificate of title. (R. 
205) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I 
Summary judgment is proper only where there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and where the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing a 
lower court's conclusions of law, the reviewing court exam-
ines the conclusions of law for correctness and is not 
required to accord any deference to those conclusions. 
Because the lower court's conclusions of law are incorrect, 
Plaintiffs were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
and the judgment against Valley should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT II, POINT A 
Section 70A-9-203, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), 
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides that a security 
interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties 
when 1) there is a written security agreement; 2) the secured 
party has given value for the security interest; and 3) the 
debtor has rights in the collateral. Because Valley has 
complied with all three requirements, Valley's security 
interest in the cement mixer attached, rendering Valley1s 
security interest in the cement mixer valid and enforceable. 
ARGUMENT II, POINT B 
Section 70A-9-301, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), 
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code is the sole provision 
which addresses and resolves the relative priorities between 
an unperfected security interest of the type held by Valley 
and a claimed ownership interest of the type asserted by 
Plaintiffs. In order to prevail over an unperfected security 
interest, §70A-9-301 requires that a party must be a buyer 
and have received delivery of the collateral. The fact that 
the cement mixer was transferred to J.P. Creer in partial 
satisfaction of a money debt owed to him by L.A. Young for 
previously rendered legal services precludes Plaintiffs from 
being buyers within the meaning of §70A-9-301. Additionally, 
J.P. Creer never had possession of the cement mixer and 
neither J.P. Creer nor F. Creer ever received delivery of the 
cement mixer. According to the terms of §70A-9-301, Valley's 
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unperfected security interest is superior to Plaintiff's 
claimed ownership interest in the cement mixer. 
ARGUMENT III 
Plaintiffs repeatedly emphasize that the perfection 
of a security interest in a motor vehicle must be effectuated 
in accordance with the Utah Motor Vehicle Act. However/ 
Plaintiffs have failed to cite authority which addresses the 
treatment of security interests which are unperfected as 
against competing claims of ownership. Essentially/ Plain-
tiffs argue that the perfection of a security interest is the 
exclusive means by which a person may prevail against a 
competing claim of ownership in a vehicle. Plaintiffs' 
contention is unfounded and constitutes a serious misun-
derstanding of Draper Bank and Trust Co. v. Lavsori/ 675 P.2d 
1174 (Utah 1983). 
ARGUMENT I 
THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT REQUIRED 
TO ACCORD ANY DEFERENCE TO THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND REVIEWS THOSE CONCLUSIONS FOR 
CORRECTNESS 
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)/ Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Valley contends on appeal that the 
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lower court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the grounds that the lower court's conclusions of 
law are incorrect so that Defendants were not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
It is a well settled principle of appellate review 
that an appellate court is not required to accord any de-
ference to the lower court's conclusions of law. Wessel v. 
Erickson Landscaping Co.; 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985). This 
court has consistently held that in reviewing a trial court's 
legal conclusions/ the reviewing court examines the lower 
court's legal conclusions for correctness. Wessel, 711 P.2d 
at 253; Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
In this appeal, Valley accepts as true the factual 
findings adopted by the district court. Thus, Valley readily 
endorses the crucial facts that L.A. Young granted Valley a 
valid security interest in the cement mixer, that L.A. Young 
transferred title to the cement mixer to J.P. Creer as 
partial satisfaction of L.A. Young's obligation to J.P. Creer 
for the payment of legal fees, and that J.P. Creer at no time 
received delivery or had possession of the cement mixer. 
Valley does, however, challenge the district court's 
conclusions of law that 1) Valley's failure to perfect its 
security interest in the cement mixer precludes it from 
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prevailing over F. Creer's ownership claim to the cement 
mixer; and that 2) F. Creer's claim to the cement mixer is 
superior to Valley's unperfected security interest in the 
cement mixer. As explained below, the district court failed 
to properly apply §70A-9-301(1) of the Utah Uniform Com-
mercial Code to determine the relative priority of each 
parties' claim. Because Plaintiffs were not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, the district court erred in 
granting judgment against Valley and the judgment should be 
reversed in favor of Valley. 
ARGUMENT II 
VALLEY HAS AN ENFORCEABLE SECURITY 
INTEREST IN THE CEMENT MIXER WHICH 
HAS PRIORITY OVER PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIMED INTEREST 
POINT A: Valley's Security Interest in the Cement Mixer 
Has Attached and is Enforceable Against J.P. 
Creer and F. Creer. 
Section 70A-9-203, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), 
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, provides that a security 
interest in collateral is not enforceable against the debtor 
or third parties unless three requirements are met. First, 
the debtor must have a signed, written security agreement. 
§70A-9-203(a). Second, a secured party must give value for 
the security interest. §70A-0-203(b). Finally, the debtor 
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must have rights in the collateral. §70A-9-203(c). See, 
Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121, 1125 
(Utah 1974) . 
In the case at bar, all three requirements for 
Valley's security interest to attach are met. With regard to 
the first requirement, Lays executed and delivered to Valley 
a written security agreement granting Valley a security 
interest in the cement mixer on October 28, 1983. (R. 204) 
In satisfaction of the second requirement, Valley gave value 
for the security interest by extending a loan to Lays in the 
sum of $250,000, as evidenced by the Note. (R. 174, 204) 
Finally, because Lays had title to and possession of the 
cement mixer (R. 5), Lays had acquired "rights" to the cement 
mixer. Having met all three conditions, Valley's security 
interest in the cement mixer attached and became enforceable 
against Lays and third parties such as J.P. Creer and F. 
Creer. 
The lower court failed to appreciate the signi-
ficance of the attachment of a security interest in col-
lateral. The effect of the attachment of a security interest 
in collateral is to establish the creditor's rights in the 
collateral vis a vis the debtor, and in some instances, third 
parties. Outlining the three requirements necessary for a 
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security interest to attach, §70A-9-203 provides that once 
those three requirements have been met/ the security interest 
attaches to the collateral and becomes enforceable against 
the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral. 
In the absence of a superior competing interest/ a security 
interest which has attached to the collateral entitles the 
creditor to the right to repossess the collateral upon 
default of the underlying obligation, according to the 
provisions of Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
Perfection, on the other hand, establishes a creditor's 
rights in collateral in relation to other perfected security 
interests and other third parties. 
Recognizing that the holder of an unperfected 
security interest has a valid and enforceable interest in the 
collateral/ the question arises as to whether there are any 
circumstances under which an unperfected security-interest 
holder has priority over other interests in the collateral. 
That inquiry is answered by §70A-9-301, Utah Code Ann. (1953 
as amended), of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. Section 
70A-9-301 is the sole provision which addresses and resolves 
the relative priorities between an unperfected security 
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interest of the type held by Valley and the owner of goods of 
the type asserted by Plaintiffs.1 
POINT B: Under §70A-9-301(1)(c) of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code, Valleyfs Security Interest in the 
Cement Mixer is Superior to Plaintiffs1 Ownership 
Claim Because Plaintiffs are not "Buyers" and Have 
not "Received Delivery of the Collateral". 
Section 70A-9-301 , Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
enumerates various categories of persons who are deemed to 
take priority over persons with unperfected security in-
terests. That section provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (2), an unperfected security 
interest is subordinate to the rights of 
(c) in the case of goods . . . a person 
who is not a secured party and who is a . 
• • buyer not in the ordinary course of 
business . . . to the extent he gives 
value and receives delivery of the 
collateral without knowledge of the 
security interest and before it is 
perfected. . . 
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiff's claim of ownership interest to 
the cement mixer has priority over Valley's unperfected se-
The Utah Motor Vehicle Act contains no provisions which 
address the competing interests of a party with an 
unperfected security interest in a vehicle and a party 
with a claimed ownership interest, who is not a buyer of 
the vehicle and who has not received delivery or posses-
sion of the vehicle. 
- 12 -
curity interest only if they can establish that they have met 
all the requirements of §70A-9-301. Plaintiffs clearly have 
not satisfied the requirements of being a "buyer" and of 
having "received delivery of the collateral." 
Defining "buyer in the ordinary course of business/" 
§70A-1-201(9) of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides 
that "![b]uyingf . . . does not include a transfer through or 
in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt." See 
Walter E. Heller Western/ Inc. v. Bohemia, Inc./ 61 Or. App. 
57, 655 P.2d 1073 (Or. 1972). Applying this definition to 
the facts of this case/ J.P. Creer was clearly not a "buyer" 
of the cement mixer. The lower court's findings of fact 
state that: 
[a]t the time he received the title to the 
cement mixer, J.P. Creer intended and 
understood that it was being transferred 
to him in partial satisfaction of L.A. 
Young's obligation to pay legal fees. . . 
(R. 205) Throughout this litigation, J.P. Creer has admit-
ted that L.A. Young owed him a money debt for previously 
rendered legal services and that title to the cement mixer 
was transferred to him in partial satisfaction of that debt. 
(R. 3, 145/ 205) 
In addition to not being "buyers" within the meaning 
of §70A-9-301/ Plaintiffs also did not "receive delivery of 
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the collateral," as required by §70A-9-301. See, Federal 
Insurance Deposit Corp, v. Yates, 719 S.W.2d 481, 484-485 
(Mo. App. 1986). As indicated in the lower court's findings 
of fact, J.P. Creer has at no time received delivery or had 
possession of the cement mixer. (R. 205) In September, 
1987, F. Creer briefly obtained possession of the cement 
mixer for a few minutes without the consent and against the 
will of an officer of the debtor, Alan Young. (R. 181-182, 
190-191) F. Creer relinquished his possession of the cement 
mixer after being told by Alan Young that if F. Creer took 
the vehicle, there would be a serious altercation. (R. 
181-182, 190-191) F. Creer1s momentary possession of the 
cement mixer clearly does not constitute a delivery by L.A. 
Young of the cement mixer to J.P. Creer. Because Plaintiffs 
are not "buyers" and because J.P. Creer did not "receive 
delivery" of the cement mixer, Plaintiffs cannot prevail 
against Valley's enforceable security interest in the cement 
mixer. 
Valley's security interest in the cement mixer 
attached to the cement mixer and became enforceable against 
the debtor, L.A. Young. The priority of that security 
interest in relation to a claimed ownership interest, such as 
Plaintiffs', is resolved by §70A-9-301. Because that section 
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dictates that Valley's interest is superior to Plaintiffs'/ 
the lower court erred in granting Plaintiffs' summary judg-
ment as a matter of law and the judgment should be reversed 
in favor of Valley. 
ARGDMENT III 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH MOTOR 
VEHICLE CODE ARE ABSOLUTELY IRRE-
LEVANT TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE 
PRIORITY OF VALLEY'S AND PLAIN-
TIFFS' COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE 
CEMENT MIXER 
Plaintiffs' position in this case is that the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code is inapplicable because the facts 
involve a motor vehicle. (Response to Appellants' Motion for 
Reversal of Judgment, filed June 8, 1988, p. 1) Plaintiffs 
assert instead that the provisions of the Utah Motor Vehicle 
Act exclusively govern the parties' competing claims to the 
cement mixer and entitle Plaintiffs' to a prior right to the 
cement mixer. (R. 182) Plaintiffs cite absolutely no 
authority for either contention. 
Plaintiffs have repeatedly asserted in the trial 
court and on appeal the rule that the perfection of a sec-
urity interest in a motor vehicle must be effectuated in 
accordance with the Utah Motor Vehicle Act. Valley does not 
dispute this principle and concedes/ as it has throughout the 
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course of this litigation, that it did not perfect its sec-
urity interest in the cement mixer. 
Plaintiffs' discussion of the method by which a 
security interest in a vehicle must be perfected demonstrates 
Plaintiffs' lack of understanding of the distinction between 
the method of perfecting a security interest in motor vehi-
cles and the procedure to determine the priority of an 
unperfected security interest in a vehicle and a claimed 
ownership interest of a person who has not received delivery 
or possession of the vehicle and whose interest was obtained 
as payment of an antecedent debt. 
Essentially, Plaintiffs1 argue that the perfection 
of a security interest under the Utah Motor Vehicle Act is 
the exclusive means by which a person may prevail against a 
competing claim of ownership in a vehicle. Plaintiffs appear 
to base their argument on their understanding of this court's 
decision in Draper Bank and Trust Co. v. Lawson, 675 P.2d 
1174 (Utah 1983). Draper Bank stands for the proposition 
that the Utah Motor Vehicle Act provides the exclusive means 
to perfect the security interest in vehicles. Draper Bank, 
675 P.2d at 1177. It does not state or suggest that the 
perfection of a security interest in a vehicle is determin-
ative of the priority of competing claims to a vehicle. 
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Plaintiffs construe Draper Bank far beyond its stated holding 
to mean that unless a person's security interest in a vehicle 
is perfected under the Motor Vehicle Act, that person loses 
all interest in the vehicle, regardless of the strength of 
competing claims to the vehicle. According to Plaintiff's 
view, a person who has given no value for the vehicle, who 
has actual knowledge of the pre-existing security interest, 
and who has never had possession or delivery of the vehicle, 
has a superior interest in the vehicle to the person who has 
a valid and enforceable, but unperfected security interest. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's assumption, failing to 
perfect a security interest does not extinguish the security 
interest and the rights associated with it. Those rights 
continue to exist. Where one of two competing claims is an 
unperfected security interest, the resolution of those claims 
is governed by §70A-9-301 of the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code. When that section is properly applied, Valley is 
entitled to judgment against Plaintiffs as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's conclusions of law are incorrect. 
According to §70A-9-203, Valley acquired a valid and en-
forceable security interest which attached to the cement 
mixer. Section 70A-9-301 is the exclusive provision which 
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addresses competing claims of holders of unperfected security 
interests and ownership claims of persons who are not secured 
parties, such as Plaintiffs. In order for Plaintiffs' 
claimed ownership interest to prevail over Valley's attached, 
but unperfected security interest, Plaintiffs must satisfy 
each of the requirements set forth in §70A-9-301(1)(c). 
Because Plaintiffs are not buyers and have not received 
delivery of the collateral, Plaintiffs' claim to the cement 
mixer is inferior to Valley's. Section 70A-9-301 therefore 
dictates as a matter of law that Valley's interest in the 
cement mixer is superior to Plaintiffs' claimed interest. 
Because Plaintiffs are not entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law, Valley respectfully requests that this court reverse 
the lower court's judgment and grant judgment in favor of 
Valley, together with Valley's attorney's fees and the costs 
of the appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of August, 
1988. .-^ "" 
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Pro Se 
1200 Benefir • * 
Si:>< ,:J 
36 South State " t . 
Sal * -.^ kp fitv 
KLl'Ifi Bi - HL RCMLE. 
A t t o r n e y :,. i P l a i n t i J * f - p ^ c 
Frank Movie Creer 
50 South tfa :n St , te :> ->. 
DATED > - L 3 . . . 
BIELE,--HASLAM & HATCH 
rx'ji^ 
--»Y DOCTOSMAN 
orneys /for Defendants-
Appellants 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
JOHN PRESTON CREER (0 753) 
A11orney fo r P1a i n tiff 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 11 
Telephone: (801 ) 538-2300 
*£ / # ^  
.-J ^ 
llr: SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
FRANK MOYLE CREER and 
JOHN PRESTON CREER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v s, 
\ A i_ -_.: -1: 3 A I\ K . . n ». 'I .A KJ WJ s 
COMPANY, a Utan Corporation, 
" -I.LEY CENTRAL BANK, .-. 
^ Corpora T:1'"-^  , and 
_ S TAYL< * * --^  vcr, 
FINDINGS OF fA„ 
CONCLUSIONS OF 
C i v I ] No. 87-10-10140-1 
JUDGE DON V TIBBS 
T.;L. p.ii: LIL:_> : cross-motions for summary judgment came on 
regularly f< i .varinq before the undersi ined ', y * -
dt i u ; 
and rrpi coc* 
was r,ei tne 
ree 
-*. l i i l T i S e i L j .>; < ' ^ r l i i n - 1 t : 
^ p r e s e n t h in , .
 t* • . -• 
v
.oy I f J i -*_ r , 
' :rT' i \eicn 
P r e s t o n 
e f e n d a n t s , \H. lev 
Bank cma Tiu»L Oo^r 
"Valley") were represented by their counsel, John T. Anderson of 
Biele, Haslam & Hatch. Defendant, Marcus Taylor, appeared and 
represented himself pro se. 
The court having heard and considered the arguments, 
representations and stipulations of counsel, and having orally 
announced its decision to grant plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment and deny defendants' motion for summary judgment, hereby 
makes and enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 22, 1982, Lays Rock Products, Inc. 
("Lays"), a corporation which was later merged into L. A. Young 
Sons Construction Company ("L.A. Young"), executed and delivered 
to Valley a promissory note ("Note") in the principal sum of 
$250,000.00. 
2. As security for the Note, Lays, on October 22, 
1983, granted to Valley a security interest in certain personal 
property including an International cement mixer, Cummins 230, 
Serial No. CF257HHA23465 (the "Cement Mixer"). 
3. Valley never perfected its security interest in 
the Cement Mixer by complying with the requirements of the Utah 
Motor Vehicle Code. 
4. Plaintiff, John Preston Creer ("J.P. Creer"), 
performed legal services for L. A. Young between about June, 
1986, and March, 1987. 
2 
• 5* I - * . . J . ! " d i l - d t . o m p e n s a t e J . P. Creer f o r 
Y \\ ' , I I i i n MI: 
i n i ^ i T i e - , :• , -f > - • w u u i u m • t. d i i t i n u e his l e g a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n u n l e s s payment ** .<; made ni t hn l e g a l b i l l 
6 . At/oi n ml i I i ] Ill 'i |P I t II ing 
( t h r o u ' i 1 : V. ~ ^ : • . e x e c u t e d and d e l i v e r e d t ' r e - - i 
cer4" i f' cat*" *' • : * * * h^ '"'em - • Mixer * ^ 
t ; . . i . .^r : ' . . -«-.:. -° M i x e r *-• 
Frank C r e e r ' V . C r e t - i " ) . 
7 
J . D p r o n ] , ir-uutru J-H. u i i u t i b i . c u u .i: i- wib b e i n g t r a n s ! e r r e d 
t o h i T p t • - i a 1 $ a t ! Q t . i r h - - > n of I A Yoi i n g ' s o b "i ^ rr1 f y ! t i *o p a y 
l e g . . 
i ^t.-r r. :s nevt-r received delivery oi ^ad 
posses^iuu ^ •' Cement, rjixti. 
possession r
 eTT!<3p4- Mi vor- -epLembtrL -.>: L?^ 
reluiquisht* : • \_:t possession a^:n being threatened wnii bouiiy 
i nj
 i; 
9 John Preston Creer did ~~A- ' >w there had be*-:, a 
security mtere^- :* . .2 .alley _. -he Cement Mixer at the time 
t u . . . , j # 
* e u t r n r - ~ T r e e r a s s e r t - a 
s e c u r i t y i ^ f ^ e s t ^ ' " •! '•!-•• » v r - - - i t t i e i 
>\ o w n e r s ; . : ; . • -,*..,• _ . . , :,,
 A .v, i.Ucate » 
1 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendants' failure to perfect their security 
interest in the Cement Mixer in accordance with the provisions of 
Sections 41-1-80-87f Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
precludes them from asserting their priority in the Cement Mixer 
as against the claim of ownership of plaintiffs. 
2. Plaintiffs' claim of ownership in and to the 
Cement Mixer is superior to the unperfected security interest of 
defendants in the Cement Mixer. 
DATED this (p day of April, 1988. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
( /^A^V^I<r— 
BY THE COURT: 
John^T. Anderson 
Attorney for Defendants 
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ADDENDUM NO. 2 / ^ / ^ 
JOHN PRESTON CREER (0753) 
Attorney Pro Se 
1200 Beneficial Lit, 
5 b S.AU.n S t a t e Street 
iit Lake C i t \ , U t a h 
•£~<L 
THI SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUP )! oh S r , V l h h COUNTS 
STATE *ri Tfl ' 
FRANK MOYLE CREER and 
JOHN PRESTON CREER, 
P.] a i i 11:i f f s , 
v s. 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUS'l 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
VALLEY CENTRAL BANK, A 
U tah Corpora tion , a nci 
MARCUS TAYLOR, Receiver, 
Defendar 
JUDGMENT 
( i in i in i i i i i in i -I u ] 
J U l i C K 11")! J V "III11 | HI 
P1 a i i 1 1 i f £ s ' a n d d e f e n d a n t s f Votior>~ 
J u d g m e i v :a;nLj o n b e f o r e t h e a b o v e ••rv : r . l p p , r , :i 
1 9 8 8 : ' * 
P r e S l u , . , ' j p p c a l i r u j l- 1 \ ' ] • p j . l l ! : t . l t I S , ; * : I-
a p p e a r i n q f - t h p > v - t p n d a p t , > i<=,c'].^' - >*;.-> b°< 
i r r i : , - > 
M ^ v- r- t , 
- r . d e r s o n 
i — - e d 
. x.. . i d 
e : i i e r e < i . • i M d i n g s o i f a c t ^-,-i C o n c l u s i o n s t L a * ; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ' HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. That the plaintiff Frank Moyle Creer has title to 
the 1978 International cement mixer truck (I.D. VIN-CF 
257HHA23465) and that the defendants, Valley Central Bank and 
Valley Bank & Trust Company have no interest in said truck. 
DATED this <g day of April, 1988. 
2 
